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Abstract
This paper compares Ramsey optimal policy for the new-Keynesian model with
public debt with its scal theory of the price level (FTPL) equilibrium. Both the
scal theory of the price level and Ramsey optimal policy implies that a decit
shock is instantaneously followed by an increase of ination and output gap. But
each optimal policy parameters belongs in di¤erent sets with respect to FTPL.
The optimal scal rule parameter implies local stability of public debt dynamics
("passive scal policy"). The optimal Taylor rule parameter for ination is larger
than one. The optimal Taylor rule parameter for output gap is negative, because of
the intertemporal substitution e¤ect of interest rate on output gap. Both Taylor rule
optimal parameters implies the local stability of ination and output gap dynamics.
JEL classication numbers: C61, C62, E43, E44, E47, E52, E58.
Keywords: Fiscal theory of the Price Level, Ramsey optimal policy.
1 Introduction
The scal theory of the price level, in what follows FTPL, predicts that a decit shock
instantaneously implies a rise of ination and of output gap in the new-Keynesian model
with public debt (Woodford (1996; 1998), Bonam and Lukkezen (2019), Cochrane (2019)).
The FTPL equilibrium is an alternative to new-Keynesian equilibrium (Cochrane (2019)).
But the local instability of public debt dynamics in the FTPL implies the policy-
makers lack of credibility. This is explained e.g. by Benassy (2009): "The basic idea be-
hind the FTPL is that the government pursues scal policies such that, in o¤-equilibrium
paths, it will not satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint, and run an explosive debt
policy. This leaves only one feasible equilibrium path. Now although such o¤-equilibrium
paths are not observed in the models equilibrium, it would be extremely optimistic to
assume that in real life situations the economy would follow at every instant the equilib-
rium path while the government pursues such policies. As a result many people would be
reluctant to advise such policies to a real life government."
Svensson (2003) and Cochrane (2011) describes Ramsey optimal policy as a bench-
mark: "In most (Ramsey) analysis of policy choices,..., we think of governments choosing
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policy congurations while taking rst order conditions as constraints; we think of gov-
ernments acting in markets." This paper shows that Ramsey optimal policy assuming a
minimal credibility of the policy makers commitment is an answer to the issue raised by
Benassy (2009), using Chatelain and Ralf (2019a) algorithm.
As the FTPL, Ramsey optimal policy has the same key prediction for the transmission
mechanism of the new-Keynesian model with public debt: a decit shock instantaneously
implies a rise of ination and of output gap. By contrast to the FTPL, Ramsey optimal
policy implies the local stability of the equilibrium in the space of ination, output gap
and public debt.
This local stability is obtained because each parameters in the optimal policy rule
belongs in di¤erent sets that the ones of ad hoc policy rules for the FTPL. The opti-
mal scal rule parameter implies local stability of public debt dynamics ("passive scal
policy"). The optimal Taylor rule parameter for ination is larger than one (instead of
below one for the FTPL). The optimal Taylor rule parameter for output gap is negative,
because of the intertemporal substitution e¤ect of interest rate on output gap (Chatelain
and Ralf (2019b)). Both Taylor rule optimal parameters implies the local stability of
ination and output gap dynamics.
Because of the policy makers credibility of his commitment, there is no longer inde-
terminacy with multiple equilibrium path converging to long run equilibrium. Optimal
initial condition are derived for ination and output gap.
Section 1 solves Ramsey optimal policy model for the new-Keynesian model with
public debt and compares it with the FTPL equilibrium. Section 2 concludes.
2 New-Keynesian model with public debt: Policy
Transmission Mechanism
The scal theory of the price level applied on the new-Keynesian model with public
debt can be found in Woodford (1996, 1998), Bonam and Lukkezen (2019) and Cochrane
(2019). All variables as log-deviations of an equilibrium. In the representative households
intertemporal substitution consumption Euler equation, the expected future output gap
Etxt+1 is positively correlated with the real rate of interest, equal to the nominal rate
it minus expected ination Ett+1. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES)
 = 1= is a measure of the responsiveness of the growth rate of consumption to the
interest rate, usually considered to be smaller than one. It is the inverse of , the relative
uctuation aversion or the relative degree of resistance to intertemporal substitution of
consumption, which measures the strength of the preference for smoothing consumption
over time.
xt = Etxt+1    (it   Ett+1) + zt with  > 0: (1)
In the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, expected ination Ett+1 is negatively correlated
with the current output gap xt with a sensitivity   < 0.
t = Ett+1 + xt + ut with 0 <  < 1 and  > 0:
The intertemporal budget constraint of the state for public debt Bt is:
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Bt+1 = (1 + it)Bt   ptst ) Bt+1
pt+1
= (1 + it)
Bt
pt
pt
pt+1
  st
The primary surplus is lump-sum tax income minus non-interest expenditures: st =
t   g. Dene a steady state with ination equal to zero  = 0, with the real rate of
interest equal to the discount rate so that i  = i =  1 1, with steady state public
debt B

p
 0. In that steady state, the surplus pays the real interest cost of the debt:
s =     g = ( 1   1) B
p
 0. Hence, steady state surplus is a small proportion of
the stock of public debt, of an order of magnitude of 1% per quarter. Woodford (1996,
equation 2.9) log-linearize the public debt equation in deviation from its steady state:
bt+1 = 
 1 (bt   t) + it  
 
 1   1 st
The marginal e¤ect of funds rate on future public debt (equal to one) is around 100
times larger than the marginal e¤ect of surplus (equal to the opposite of the discount
rate) for quarterly periods. The dynamic system includes three policy targets (output
gap, ination, public debt) and two policy instrument (funds rate and primary surplus):
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it st

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Shocks "x, " and "b are assumed to be independently and identically distributed
without auto-correlation, with mean zero and a non-zero variance-covariance matrix.
The variance covariance matrix of disturbances does not matter for seeking the optimal
solution (Simon (1956) certainty equivalence result for linear quadratic regulator).
The three policy targets, the output gap xt, ination t and public debt bt are two-
time-step Kalman (1960) controllable by the two policy instrument (the interest rate it
and surplus st) and only by the policy rate (using the rst column Bi: of matrix B) if
 6= 0,  6= 0.
rank
 
B;AB;A2B

= rank
 
Bi:;ABi:;A
2Bi:

= 3 if  6= 0 and  6= 0.
The surplus instrument alone is only able to control public debt if  6= 1, using the
second column B:s of matrix B)
rank
 
B:s;AB:s;A
2B:s

= 1 if  6= 1.
We use  = 0:99 for quarterly periods and  = 0:1,  = 0:5 numerical values instead of
Woodford (1996) numerical values  = 0:95 for yearly periods and  = 0:3,  = 1 which
are oversized with respect to posterior estimations U.S.A. since the 1960s (Havranek
(2015), Mavroeidis et alii (2014)).
The transmission parameter of funds rate on future debt is equal to 1 which is nearly
100 times larger in absolute value than the transmission parameter of the surplus (0:01).
This implies that parameters of the surplus rule would have to be 100 times larger than
the parameters of the Taylor rule to have the same size in the parameters of the closed
loop system.
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3 Ramsey Optimal Policy under Quasi-Commitment
In a monetary policy regime indexed by j, a policy maker may re-optimize on each future
period with exogenous probability 1  q strictly below one, labeled "quasi commitment"
(Schaumburg and Tambalotti, 2007 and Debortoli and Nunes, 2014)). Following Schaum-
burg and Tambalotti (2007), we assume that the mandate to minimize the loss function
is delegated to a sequence of policy makers with a commitment of random duration. The
degree of credibility is modelled as if it is a change of policy-maker with a given prob-
ability of reneging commitment and re-optimizing optimal plans. The length of their
tenure or "regime" depends on a sequence of exogenous i.i.d. Bernoulli signals ftgt0
with Et [t]t0 = 1  q, with 0 < q  1. If t = 1; a new policy maker takes o¢ ce at the
beginning of time t. Otherwise, the incumbent stays on. A higher probability q can be
interpreted as a higher credibility. A policy maker with little credibility does not give a
large weight on future welfare losses. The policy maker j solves the following problem
for regime j, omitting subscript j, before policy maker k starts:
V j0 =  E0
t=+1X
t=0
(q)t

1
2
 
Q
2
t +Qxx
2
t +Qbb
2
t + ii
2
t + ss
2
t

+  (1  q)V kt

Ination, output gap and public debt next period are an average between two terms.
The rst term, with weight q is the ination, output gap and public debt that would
prevail under the current regime upon which there is commitment. The second term
with weight 1  q is the ination and public debt that would be implemented under the
alternative regime by policy maker k.:
q
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The optimal program for policy maker j is a discounted linear quadratic regulator
(LQR) with a "credibility adjusted" discount factor q. We apply Chatelain and Ralf
(2019a) algorithm using
p
qA=q and
p
qB=q (Scilab code in the appendix).
Preferences of the policy maker are given by positive weights for the three policy tar-
gets Qx  0, Q  0, Qb  0 (Q = diag(Qx; Q; Qb) in the Scilab algorithm). In order
to insure the concavity of the LQR program, there are at least non-zero policy makers
preferences for interest rate smoothing and primary surplus smoothing, with strictly pos-
itive weights for these two policy instruments in the loss function: i > 0, s > 0. In
the simulation grid on preferences of this paper, these strictly positive weights are also
set down to 10 7 with respect to at least one other weight for policy targets set to 1.
They are stacked in matrix R = diag(i; s) in the Scilab algorithm. In what follows, we
consider the polar case of maximal credibility (q = 1). Results for any level of limited
credibility 0 < q < 1 can be found using the algorithm in appendix 1.
The policy maker seeks optimal linear feedback rules parameters stacked in matrix F:
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Replacing feedback rules in the transmission mechanism leads to a closed loop system
with transition matrix
p
q
q
(A+BF) for the algorithm:
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When the Taylor rule does not include a reaction of funds rate to public debt (Fb = 0),
the closed-loop matrix remains block triangular. In this case, we use these notations for
the private sector closed-loop dynamics:
Ax +BxFx =
p
q
q

1 + 

  

 

1


+
p
q
q
  
0
 
Fx F

It is the transition matrix of the closed loop new-Keynesian model excluding public
debt when shocks are not auto-regressive.
The case of the peg of policy instruments at their long-run value F = 0 corresponds
to an open loop system with transition matrix A.
Varying the policy makers preferences in all their range of possible values is equivalent
to nd the determinacy conditions on the rule parameters in the case of simple rules.
Specic values of preferences for households welfare would be somewhere in this locus for
policy rule. Tables 1 to 4 present solutions of the four polar cases of the policy makers
preferences.
Case 1: Maximal Inertia. Maximal inertia where the weight on the volatility of
the policy targets is zero and the weight of each of the two policy instrument is any
non-zero value which could be di¤erent for each of the two instruments, for example:
diag(Q;R) = (0; 0; 0; 1; 1). Changing the relative weight between the two instrument
(107 to 10 7) does not change the results.
The Hamiltonian system of the LQR with 3 state variables for the policy maker and
3 co-state variables has a transition matrix H6 of dimension six which is symplectic: its
transpose is similar to its inverse. This implies that the list of eigenvalues of H6 (its
spectrum H) is such that all inverse of each eigenvalues belong the spectrum. Hence,
if there is no eigenvalues exactly on the unit circle, there is an equal number (three) of
eigenvalues inside the unit circle and outside the unit circle. Because of the requirement of
local stability of the optimal solution, the optimal solution selects three stable eigenvalues
available in the spectrum H. This method has been extended to the solution of rational
expectations models not necessarily derived from optimal behavior by Blanchard and
Kahn (1980).
With maximal inertia, the spectrum includes the three eigenvalues of the open-loop
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transition matrix A where F = 0 and their three inverse of these eigenvalues.
H =
 
1:201 0:7481 1:005 1=1:201 1=0:7481 1=1:005

A =
 
1:201 0:7481 1:005

, A+BF =
 
0:8322 0:7481 0:995

The open loop transition matrix A includes two unstable eigenvalues. In particu-
lar, debt dynamics is exploding without negative-feedback. Then, the maximal inertia
eigenvalues A+BF includes the two inverse of these eigenvalues and keeps the eigen-
value inside the unit circle. For this reason, maximal inertia implies nonetheless non-zero
optimal policy rule parameters. These policy parameters insures the local stability in
dimension three of the closed-loop system.
it
st

=
  0:742 1:898 0
 2 1:2 1
 
xt t bt
T
It is optimal for the Taylor rule not to respond to public debt: there is no need to set
the restriction Fb = 0. The optimal surplus rule parameter Gb = 1 is such that the public
debt eigenvalue shifts from its diverging open loop value number 1=
p
 to its inverse
p
.
These eigenvalues include the factor
p
 because the loss function is discounted.p

1

+
p


Fb  

1

  1

Gb

=
p
 =
p
0:99 = 0:995 < 1
This optimal surplus rule and the resulting public debt eigenvalue with least e¤ort
stabilization of public debt remains unchanged when the policy maker does not care about
the volatility of public debt (b = 0) and for any non zero weights on ination and output
gap.
The Taylor rule parameter on ination satises the Taylor principle (1:898 > 1). The
output gap parameter is negative for Ramsey optimal policy with the new-Keynesian
model (Chatelain and Ralf (2019b)). This is because a rise of funds rate increase future
consumption and future consumption growth because of the intertemporal substitution
e¤ect for consumers. There is no income e¤ect of funds rate nor cost of capital e¤ect
decreasing investment demand as in the investment saving equation of the IS-LM model.
Hence, negative feedback aiming at decreasing future output gap implies a negative re-
sponse of funds rate when current output gap is positive. Then, the intertemporal sub-
stitution mechanism implies a relative decrease of the growth rate of future consumption.
If one reverts the signs to Keynesian mechanism:  accelerationist Phillips curve and
 (delayed cost of capital e¤ect or cost of working capital), then the sign of the response
of funds rate to output gap turns to be positive, with exactly the same numerical values
(+0:742), as it was in the good old time of Keynesian economics.
The optimal surplus rule also responds to ination and output gap. Because the
marginal parameter in B of the surplus is nearly one hundred times smaller than the one
of the funds, this leads to marginal changes of parameters relating future public debt
with current ination and current output gap than in the case of only an e¤ect due to
the Taylor rule.
The initial optimal jumps of the ination and output gap on public debt are obtained
from optimal marginal conditions. The optimal value of the loss function is:
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L =
 
x0 0 b0

P3
 
x0 0 b0
T
with P3 =

Px Px;b
Pb;x Pb

Where P3 is a square matrix of dimension three which is the solution of a discrete
algebraic Riccati equation (DARE) given by the lqr instruction in Scilab. The marginal
values of the loss function with respect to each state variables are equal to the co-state
variable or Lagrange multiplier of each state variable. If state variables for the policy
maker are jump variables of the private sector (here, ination and output gap), there
initial values is found optimizing the loss function at the initial date for each of these
variables. These marginal conditions are:

(@L=@x)t=0
(@L=@)t=0

=

x0
0

= Px

x0
0

+Px;bb0 =

0
0


x0
0

=  PxPx;bb0 =

0:653
0:255

b0
An increase of initial public debt implies a proportional increase of initial output gap
and ination, as in Woodford (1996) model, a result which is obtained for F < 1. But,
for the following periods, future values output gap and ination do not depend on current
values of public debt bt for t > 0 because the parameters of marginal e¤ects equal to zero
in the closed loop matrix A+BF. In particular, because the funds rate do not react to
public debt in the Taylor rule (Fb = 0). As seen below, this result changes when the cost
of the volatility of public debt is taken into account by the policy maker (b > 0).
For Ramsey optimal policy with maximal inertia, the optimal initial jumps of forward-
looking policy targets are chosen in order to minimize the volatility of policy instrument.
They imply that the initial jumps of the policy instruments are equal to zero:

i0=b0
s0=b0

=
  0:742 1:898 0
 2 1:2 1
0@ 0:6530:2551
1
1A =  0
0

Even though the policy instrument are equal to zero, the dynamic system is no longer
the open loop system with matrix A because this matrix includes eigenvalues outside
the unit circle. It is the closed loop system A + BF with F 6= 0 so that there is local
stability of the dynamic system in dimension three. The dimension three corresponds to
the number of policy targets for the policy maker.
With Ramsey optimal policy, there is no indeterminacy with three eigenvalues inside
the unite circle despite two forward-looking policy targets and one predetermined policy
target. Optimal initial conditions implies that the co-states of the forward-looking policy
targets are predetermined at zero: x0 = 0 = 0. Because these co-state variables have
a linear relation with the funds rate and its lag, these conditions can also be interpreted
as if the funds rate and its lag are predetermined variables.
General results.
In all the following cases where the volatility of the public debt does has no weight in
the loss function (b = 0, x  0,   0, i > 0, s > 0), the surplus rule parameters do
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not change. The surplus rule achieves the maximal inertia (minimal e¤ort) for stabilizing
public debt eigenvalue. The percentage deviation of surplus is equal to the percentage
deviation of public debt (Gb = 1). It is optimal that the funds rate do not respond to
public debt in the Taylor rule (Fb = 0). The Taylor rule only controls the eigenvalues of
output gap and ination. The Taylor rule parameters (Fx,F) are identical to those found
when assuming public debt is equal to zero at all periods (bt = 0). However, an increase
of the weight of the surplus s > 0 increases the parameter Px;b for the optimal loss
function. Hence, it increases the absolute value of the optimal initial anchor of ination
and output gap, even though the Taylor rule parameters are unchanged when varying
the surplus weight s > 0. For a negligible weight of the surplus s = 10 7, ination and
output gap anchor are instantaneously anchored at zero.
Case 2: Minimize output gap volatility (table 1).
Output gap can be stabilized on the rst period following a change of interest rate
using the Euler consumption. The stabilization of ination occurs on period two. The
correlation of the policy instrument with output gap of period one is then transmitted on
period two by the change of output gap correlated with expected ination of period two.
Hence, a policy maker only concerned with a single eigenvalue related to output gap. He
may leave the second eigenvalue mostly related to ination close to one, because the cost
of ination volatility is zero in this polar case.
When the cost of changing funds rate decreases from 1 to near-zero 10 7, the out-
put gap parameter in the Taylor rule increases in absolute value from  0:986 to  1:92
(whereas the ination rule parameter decreases from 1:82 to 1:27). The output gap
eigenvalue shifts from 0:54 to 0 (which means back to equilibrium in one period).
Table 1: Minimize output gap volatility.
i
s
Qx Q Qb
jxj jxj jbj
Fx F Fb
Gx G Gb
x0
b0
0
b0
i0
b0
s0
b0
1
1
1 0 0
0:542 0:918 0:975
 0:986 1:821 0
 2 1:2 1
0:571
0:123
 0:338
0:006
1
10 7
1 0 0
0:542 0:918 0:975
 0:986 1:821 0
 2 1:2 1
0:000009
0:000002
 0:0000005
1
10 7
1
1 0 0
0 0:995 0:975
 1:920 1:269 0
 2 1:2 1
0:378
 0:201
 0:969
0:002
10 7
10 7
1 0 0
0 0:995 0:975
 1:920 1:269 0
 2 1:2 1
0:00002
 0:00001
 0:00005
1
Case 3: Minimize ination volatility (table 2).
Because of the sequence of stabilization: period 1, output gap then period 2, ination,
stabilizing ination imposes to stabilize output gap rst. Hence two eigenvalues of the
block matrix of output gap and ination need to be modify. This requires much more
energy (volatility of the funds rate) to the policy maker.
When the cost of changing funds rate decreases from 1 to near-zero 10 7, the output
gap parameter in the Taylor rule increases in absolute value from  0:828 to  3:91 and
the ination rule parameter increases from 2:22 to... 21. The output gap eigenvalue shifts
from 0:77 to 0 (which means back to equilibrium in one period).
Table 2: Minimize ination volatility.
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i
s
Qx Q Qb
jxj jxj jbj
Fx F Fb
Gx G Gb
x0
b0
0
b0
i0
b0
s0
b0
1
1
0 1 0
0:772 0:772 0:975
 0:828 2:218 0
 2 1:2 1
0:613
0:189
 0:0088
0:0009
1
10 7
0 1 0
0:772 0:772 0:975
 0:828 2:218 0
 2 1:2 1
0:000001
0:0000001
0:00001
1
10 7
1
0 1 0
0:006 0:006 0:975
 3:919 21:209 0
 2 1:2 1
0:515
0:025
 1:486
0:00001
10 7
10 7
0 1 0
0:006 0:006 0:975
 3:919 21:209 0
 2 1:2 1
0:0038
0:0002
 0:011
0:992
Locus of Taylor rule parameters when b = 0:
When b = 0 and s > 0 and our given numerical parameters of the transmission
mechanism, we draw the locus of the reduced form values of Taylor rule parameters of
Ramsey optimal policy. Table 3 and gure 1 provide the boundaries of the triangle of
the linear quadratic regulator (LQR) reduced form Taylor rule parameters, obtained by
a simulation grid, varying the weights in the loss function in three dimensions x  0,
  0, i > 0. The sides of the LQR triangle correspond to the cases where the
central bank minimizes only the variance of ination (ination nutter) without taking
into account the zero lower bound constraint on the policy interest rate (i = 10 7 > 0),
or minimizes only the variance of output gap without taking into account the zero lower
bound (i = 10 7 > 0), or seeks only maximal inertia of the policy rate (i ! +1).
This is taken from Chatelain and Ralf (2019b).
Table 3: Taylor rule parameters for b = 0, s > 0,  = 0:1,  = 0:5,  = 0:99.
Minimize only: Q Qx i jxj jxj Fx F
Ination 1 0 10 7 7:10 5 0:006  3:92 21:21
Ination output gap 4 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:819  2:27 4:76
Ination output gap 1 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:905  2:10 3:03
Ination output gap 1=4 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:951  2:01 2:10
Output gap 0 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:995  1:92 1:21
Output gap interest 0 4 1 0:348 0:953  1:31 1:70
Output gap interest 0 1 1 0:541 0:918  0:98 1:83
Output gap interest 0 1=4 1 0:663 0:878  0:82 1:87
Interest rate 0 0 1(+1) 0:748 0:833  0:74 1:89
Ination interest 1=4 0 1 0:784 0:784  0:77 1:99
Ination interest 1 0 1 0:772 0:772  0:83 2:22
Ination interest 4 0 1 0:742 0:742  0:98 2:82
A similar analysis can be made for the alternative monetary policy transmission mech-
anism with  < 0 and  < 0, see gure 2. The numerical values of the Taylor rule
parameters are the same in absolute value. But this time, the output gap rule parameter
is positive. The new locus is symmetric with respect to the horizontal axis of the locus
with opposite signs of the transmission mechanism.
Case 4: Minimize public debt volatility (table 4):
If b > 0 and s su¢ ciently large with respect to i, the policy makers cares about
public debt volatility and it is relatively costly for him to use the surplus instrument
with respect to the funds rate instrument. In order to reduce a lot the persistence (auto-
correlation and eigenvalue) of public debt, the Taylor rule is then called into action in
addition to the surplus rule.
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In this polar case, as there is no cost of ination and output gap, the two rst eigen-
values related to these variables remain relatively large.
When the cost of changing funds rate, surplus and public are all equal to 1, the funds
rate decreases by  0:45 in proportion to public debt over its long run target and the
surplus increases by 1:3. Because the marginal e¤ect in the transmission mechanism of
the funds rate is one hundred times the one of the surplus, the fall of the surplus auto-
correlation from minimal e¤ort 0:995 (Fb = 0, Gb = 1) to 0:358 (Fb =  0:45, Gb = 1:3)
is nearly entirely due to the Taylor rule.
When the cost of changing surplus is near zero with respect to one for the cost of
changing funds rate, the fall of the autocorrelation of public debt to nearly 0 is entirely
due to the surplus rule. This implies a very large response of surplus by 100 times the
deviation of debt from its long run value (Gb = 99:8), because the marginal transmission
parameter is 100 times smaller than the one of funds rate in order to achieve the same
decrease of the auto-correlation of public debt.
When the cost of changing surplus is one with respect to near zero for the cost of
changing funds rate, the fall of the autocorrelation j3j down to zero is driven by a larger
sensitivity of the funds rate to public debt (Fb = 1) whereas the surplus policy rule
is identical to the one chosen when the policy maker does not care about public debt
volatility (Gb = 1). The funds rate policy rule contributes to 95% of the fall of public
debt persistence.
When the cost of changing surplus and changing funds rate are both near zero, the fall
of the autocorrelation j3j down to zero, this leads to marginal changes with respect the
previous case: Fb = 0:99 and Gb = 1. Because the marginal e¤ect of funds rate on public
debt is one hundred times the one of surplus in matrix B, it is more e¢ cient to use funds
rate than surplus when there is a preference for a large fall of public debt persistence.
Table 4: Minimizing public debt volatility.
i
s
Qx Q Qb
jxj jxj jbj
Fx F Fb
Gx G Gb
x0
b0
0
b0
i0
b0
s0
b0
1
1
0 0 1
0:992 0:929 0:358
 0:424 1:448  0:454
 2:641 1:620 1:323
0:614
0:187
 0:443
0:004
1
10 7
0 0 1
0:832 0:748 0:009
 0:742 1:897  0:0007
 73:46 87:84 99:833
1:124
0:440
 0:0005
55:843
10 7
1
0 0 1
0:995 0:995 10 8
 0:020 1:022  1
 2 1:2 1
0:593
0:155
 0:853
0
10 7
10 7
0 0 1
0:945 0:989 10 8
 0:030 1:029  0:995
 2:984 1:848 1:499
0:597
0:159
 0:849
0:008
4 Ramsey optimal policy versus Fiscal Theory of the
Price Level versus new-Keynesian Model
This section compares the three equilibrium based on the new-Keynesian transmission
mechanism. It refers to the diagrams (appendix 2) in the plane of Taylor rule parameters
(F; Fx)mapping eigenvalues (1; 2) inside or outside the unit circle for given parameters
of the monetary policy transmission mechanism (Chatelain and Ralf (2019b)). These
eigenvalues (1; 2) are the roots of the characteristic polynomial p () of the closed loop
matrix Ax +BxFx of new-Keynesian model with output gap and ination:
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Ax +BxFx =

1 + 

  

 

1


+
  
0
 
Fx F

p () = det(Ax +BxFx   I2) = 2   T+D = 0
p(1) =  T +D = (1  1) (1  2) , p( 1) = T +D = ( 1  1) ( 1  2)
The Taylor rule parameters (Fx; F) are a¢ ne functions of the trace T and determinant
D of the closed loop matrix Ax + BxFx. For dimension two dynamics, there is a
mapping of eigenvalues in the plane of trace T and determinant D including a stability
triangle for both eigenvalues of Ax+BxFx are inside the unit circle (see e.g. Azariadis
(1993)). Chatelain and Ralf (2019b) shows the a¢ ne-transformed mapping of eigenvalues
(1; 2) in the plane of Taylor rule parameters (Fx; F). This includes a stability triangle
where both eigenvalues of of Ax + BxFx are inside the unit circle. This stability
triangle (ABC in gure 1) include real eigenvalues such that  1 < 1  2 < 1 (region
4.1 in gure 1) and complex conjugate eigenvalues such that j1j = j2j < 1 (region 4.2
in gure 1). Its center 
 corresponds to the fully stabilized dynamic system with zero
eigenvalues 1 = 2 = 0.
This stability triangle implies that the Taylor rule parameter of ination satises the
Taylor principle. But it also implies that the Taylor rule parameter of output gap is
strictly negative, because of the intertemporal substitution e¤ect of the Euler equation.
A rise of interest rate is positively correlated with future consumption and output gap.
Hence, if output gap is currently positive, it is necessary to decrease interest rate so that
future consumption will decrease.
As a thought experiment, if the sign of the transmission parameters are reverse ( < 0,
 < 0), then the stability triangle is in the quadrant such that Fx > 0 and F > 0 (gure
2).
We locate on this diagram the policy rule parameters for the three following equilibria.
Ramsey optimal policy Equilibrium.
Chatelain and Ralf (2019b) using table 2 simulation grid show that the locus of Ram-
sey optimal policy rule parameter is a smaller triangle included into the larger stability
triangle where both eigenvalues are inside the unit circle. In particular, negative eigen-
values  1 < 1  2 < 0 cannot be eigenvalues of optimal policy (gure 3 and a zoom
in gure 5). Because Ramsey optimal policy parameter are located within the stability
triangle, this implies that its Taylor rule parameter of ination satises the Taylor prin-
ciple. But it also implies that its Taylor rule parameter of output gap is strictly negative,
because of the intertemporal substitution e¤ect of the Euler equation.
As a thought experiment, if the sign of the transmission parameters are reverse ( < 0,
 < 0), then the Ramsey triangle is within stability triangle which is this time in the
quadrant such that Fx > 0 and F > 0 (gure 4).
With Ramsey optimal policy, optimal initial conditions are derived for ination and
output gap with co-state variables of ination and output gap optimally predetermined
at zero (transversality conditions). The negative-feedback values of the policy rules para-
meters implies that the number of stable eigenvalues inside the unit circle (three in this
model) is equal to the number of forward-looking variables (output gap and ination)
and predetermined variable (public debt).
FTPL Equilibrium: Woodford (1996) assumes that surplus is a predetermined
variable which follows an exogenous auto-regressive process st = st 1+ "s instead of a
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feedback rule (its eigenvalue is 0 < s < 1) so that Gb = Gx = G = 0. Woodford (1996)
assumes that the funds rate does not respond to public debt so that Fb = 0. Then, the
public debt eigenvalue is 1

> 1. It is outside the unit-circle and cannot be controlled by
the policy maker.
Public debt is a predetermined variable. Output gap and ination are forward-looking
variables. The funds rate is assumed to be a forward-looking variable. Blanchard and
Kahn (1980) determinacy condition implies that there should be one of the eigenvalues
of the closed-loop matrix to be inside the unit circle and the other one outside the unit
circle.
This corresponds to region 1 and region 2 of gure 1. These regions are limited by
two lines. The rst line includes the segment AC. It denes the new-Keynesian border
of the Taylor principle, including the point: (F = 1, Fx = 0). It is a nearly vertical line
such that at least one of the two roots is equal 1: p(1) = 0. The second line includes the
segment BC. It is a negative slope line where at least one of the two roots is equal to  1:
p( 1) = 0.
- Region 1 on the top-left is such that  1 < 1 < 1 < 2: The ination Taylor rule
parameter does not satisfy the Taylor principle (F < 1) and it can be negative without
nite bound. Output gap rule parameter are positive without nite upper bound or
negative with a nite lower bound. The regime is restricted by Woodford (1996) to
positive and small values: 0 < F < 1 and 0 < Fx < 1 which corresponds to the FTPL
near-square of gure 5, within region 1 of gure 1.
- Region 3 on the bottom-right is such that: 1 <  1 < 2 < 1. The ination Taylor
rule parameter satises the Taylor principle (F < 1) without a nite upper bound but
the output gap rule parameter is always negative without a nite lower bound (Fx < 1).
This regime is not mentioned by Woodford (1996), but the determinacy condition is
indeed satised by these rule parameters.
New-Keynesian Equilibrium: The new-Keynesian model assumes that there is
zero net supply of public debt: bt = 0 at all periods. At this stage, there is no longer
a predetermined variable. Output gap and ination are forward-looking variables. The
funds rate is assumed to be a forward-looking variable. Then, two auto-regressive shocks
for the Euler consumption equation and for the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, with two
specic eigenvalues 0 < x < 1 and 0 <  < 1. These exogenous eigenvalues are given
and cannot be modied by policy rule parameters. The two exogenous shocks are not
controllable. Then, in order to satisfy Blanchard and Kahn determinacy condition, it is
necessary that the two roots of the closed loop block matrix for ination and output gap
dynamics are outside the unit circle.
This corresponds to the following regions in gure 1:
- On the top right, region 4.3 for complex conjugate eigenvalues such that j1j =
j2j > 1 and regions 4.4 and 4.5 with real eigenvalues: 1 < 1 < 2: The ination Taylor
rule parameter satises the Taylor principle without upper bound and some output gap
rule parameter are positive and some are negative with a nite lower bound. The new-
Keynesian regime is usually restricted to positive and small values: 1 < F < 2 and
0 < Fx < 1 which corresponds to new-Keynesian square of gure 5, within region 1 of
gure 1.
- On the bottom left, region 2: 1 < 2 <  1 on the left of the Taylor principle line
(p(1) = 0) and below the line (p( 1) = 0) including the segment CB. The ination Taylor
rule parameter does not satisfy the Taylor principle including negative value without
bound. The output gap rule parameter is often negative, or the ination Taylor rule
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parameter is negative when the output gap rule parameter is positive. These range of
parameters are not mentioned in new-Keynesian theory, but the determinacy condition
is indeed satised by these rule parameters.
Frictionless Endowment Economies
The Taylor principle is not satised in Woodford (1996) FTPL for the new-Keynesian
model with public debt. It is the same condition than for the scal theory of the price
level equilibrium in Leeper (1991) for the frictionless model of endowment economies.
But Chatelain and Ralf (2019c) found that Ramsey optimal policy for the frictionless
model of endowment economies is an interest rate peg (F = 0 < 1) where the Taylor
principle is not satised, by contrast to the result obtained in this paper for the new-
Keynesian model with public debt.
The reason is that the monetary policy transmission mechanism of frictionless endow-
ment economies (Fisher relation) reach the zero lower bound of ination persistence for
an interest rate peg to its steady state value, it = 0 and F = 0 < 1:
Ett+1 = 0:t + it
By contrast, for an interest rate peg to its steady state value, it = 0 and F =
0 < 1, there is trend ination 1

> 1 for the new-Keynesian Phillips curve transmission
mechanism. Ramsey optimal policy leans against ination spirals, so that an interest rate
peg cannot be optimal in this case. Ramsey optimal policy rule parameters are within
the stability triangle of gure 1. This implies its ination Taylor rule parameter satises
the Taylor principle and that its output gap rule parameter is strictly negative.
5 Conclusion
By construction, ad hoc policy rule for both the new-Keynesian equilibrium or the FTPL
equilibrium do not model policy makers rational behavior. In addition, surplus is as-
sumed to be an exogenous auto-regressive process instead of a feedback rule in Woodford
(1998). In the new-Keynesian model, public debt is assumed to be zero all the time.
Because at least one predetermined variable is required in order to avoid a degenerate
rational equilibrium without transitory dynamics, it is replaced by two auto-regressive
exogenous shocks (cost-push shock and productivity shock). How economic agents select
the FTPL versus the new-Keynesian equilibrium is not clear, in particular because there
is no optimal behavior by the policy maker. The policy makers have no credibility to
anchor expectations when their policy rule parameters imply local instability in the space
of policy-makers target variables.
On the other hand, the key issue with the Ramsey optimal policy is that it predicts
the unpleasant result that the output gap Taylor rule parameter is always negative in the
new-Keynesian model with or without public debt. The origin of the unpleasant sign of
Ramsey optimal policy parameter is the substitution positive e¤ect of interest rate rising
future consumption. Ramsey optimal policy is contingent to the signs of the parameters
of the transmission mechanism.
Alternative micro-foundations can restore the income e¤ect of interest rate so that it
o¤sets the intertemporal substitution e¤ect. If one assumes that there is capital in the
production, then, there can be a cost of capital e¤ect decreasing future output. A working
capital cost e¤ect on future ination can also be introduced in the new-Keynesian Phillips
curve. Credit constrained households, limited asset market participation also increase
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the magnitude of the income e¤ect. Reversing the sign of the transmission mechanism
of interest rate (substitution versus income e¤ect) reverts the sign of the output gap
parameter which then turns positive in the Taylor rule.
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6 Appendix 1: Scilab code
Remark: Scilab code computes this transformation of the preferences of the policy maker,
to be called in the LQR instruction. In our case, S = 0 and Q and R are diagonal, so
that C and D elements includes square roots of these diagonal elements of Q and R.
CT
DT
 
C D

=

Q S
ST R

Qx=0;
Qpi=0;
Qb=0 ;
Ri=1;
Rt=1;
beta1=0.99; gamma1=0.5; kappa=0.1;
A1=[1-(kappa*gamma1/beta1) -gamma1/beta1 0 ; -kappa/beta1 1/beta1 0 ; 0 -
1/beta1 1/beta1] ;
A=sqrt(beta1)*A1;
B1=[gamma1 0 ; 0 0 ; 1 1-(1/beta1) ];
B1
B=sqrt(beta1)*B1;
Q=[Qx 0 0 ; 0 Qpi 0 ; 0 0 Qb ];
R=[Ri 0 ; 0 Rt ];
Big=sysdiag(Q,R);
Big
[w,wp]=fullrf(Big);
w
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wp
C1=wp(:,1:3);
C1
D12=wp(:,4:$);
D12
M=syslin(d,A,B,C1,D12);
[Fy,Py]=lqr(M);
A+B*Fy;
spec(A)
abs(spec(A+B*Fy))
A+B*Fy
A
B
B*Fy
A
spec(A+B*Fy)
abs(spec(A+B*Fy))
Fy
Py
Px=Py(1:2,1:2)
Pd=Py(1:2,3)
T0=-inv(Px)*Pd
T0(3,1)=1
T0(1:2,1)
Ins0=Fy*T0
Fy
abs(spec(A+B*Fy))
B(:,1)*Fy(1,:)
B(:,2)*Fy(2,:)
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Figure 1: Stability triangle in the plane of policy parameters, 
γ=0.5, κ=0.1, β=0.99 
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Figure 2: Stability triangle in the plane of policy parameters, 
γ=-0.5, κ=-0.1, β=0.99 
DELTA=0
line AB- Hopf
line AC - Saddle
node p(1)
line BC Flip p(-1)
A 
C 
B 
Ω 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
-10,00
-8,00
-6,00
-4,00
-2,00
0,00
2,00
4,00
-20,00 0,00 20,00 40,00 60,00 80,00 100,00
Fx
 
F inflation 
Figure 3: LQR and stability triangle in the plane of policy 
parameters, γ=0.5, κ=0.1, β=0.99 
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Figure 4: LQR and stability triangle in the plane of policy 
parameters, γ=-0.5, κ=-0.1, β=0.99 
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Figure 5: FTPL vs New-Keynesian vs. Ramsey optimal 
policy, γ=0.5, κ=0.1, β=0.99.   
DELTA=0
line AB-
Hopf
line AC -
Saddle
node p(1)
line BC
Flip p(-1)
A 
Reg. 1: 
-1<λ1<1<λ2 
Reg. 4.1: 
         -1<λ1≤λ2<1 
 
 
Reg. 4.2: |λ|<1 
Reg. 4.3: |λ|>1 
Reg. 4.4: 1<λ1≤λ2 
 
Ramsey optimal policy   
New-Keynesian 
Hopf bifurcation 
FTPL 
